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Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
Fast Tract Title Servs., Inc. v. Barry
| 113716 | Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; res judicata. Trial court erred in dismissing complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) based on res judicata. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5216 |
In re Adoption of R.L.A.
| 113860 | Adoption; adoption petition; R.C. 3107.07(A); consent to adopt; justifiable cause; failure to support; failure to communicate. The trial court did not err in finding that the biological father’s consent to adopt was not required because there was clear and convincing evidence that the biological father had failed to support or communicate with the child in the statutory time period. The biological father had never supported his child and had no communication with the child in several years. There was no evidence that the biological mother or prospective adoptive father substantially interfered in the biological father’s attempts to communicate with the child. The biological father offered no evidence of his income during the statutory time frame other than testimony that his income decreased during the pandemic. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
|
10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5218 |
State v. Malone
| 113700 | Motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial; hearing; “unavoidably prevented.” To obtain leave to file a delayed new-trial motion, a defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial. Appellant fails to attest to the circumstances relating to his late discovery of the new evidence other than the fact that he discovered the new evidence in 2023, nine years after his conviction. Furthermore, the alleged new evidence consists of several journal entries and a docket in two cases, which are matters of public record. Appellant’s affidavit offered no explanations for his efforts to uncover favorable evidence, the circumstances he discovered the new evidence, or the reasons for the nine-year delay. Because he has failed to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence to uncover the documents that have been in existence for years even before his conviction, we do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the instant motion for leave. The trial court similarly did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion without a hearing because he fails to carry his burden of submitting documents that on their face support his claim of being unavoidably prevented from discovering the new evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5215 |
Cleveland v. City Redevelopment, L.L.C.
| 113651 | Housing court; violations; building code; compliance; community-control sanctions; abuse of discretion; primary goal of misdemeanor sentencing; Jones test. Judgment affirmed in part, modified in part, and remanded. The housing court abused its discretion in this case when it prohibited the appellant from selling the subject property and any properties owned by appellant in the city as part of its community-control sanctions when the appellant was in full compliance with the city’s code at the time of sentencing. The primary goal of misdemeanor sentencing was satisfied in this matter — the violations were corrected and the Property was brought into full compliance with all building codes. Therefore, the matter is reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to issue a new sentencing entry modifying the appellant’s sentence by deleting only the portion of community-control sanctions requiring the appellant to “not to sell, gift, or transfer the properties it owns within the City of Cleveland while on community control without approval of the Court.” The remaining portions of the appellant’s community-city control sanctions are affirmed. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5213 |
Tilton v. Geronimo
| 113571 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); breach of contract; unjust enrichment; trespass; fraudulent misrepresentation; consideration. Judgment affirmed. Summary judgment was proper when there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the parties’ agreement. Appellants agreed to the removal of 16 arborvitae trees so appellees could replace their driveway. Appellees’ agreement to forgo expanding their driveway and removing all of the trees lining their property, in exchange for appellants’ permission to remove the 16 arborvitaes, was valid consideration. Appellees were not fraudulently induced into this agreement. The agreement, which was expressed in the parties’ emails, did not include reimbursement. Because there was a valid contract, the trespass and unjust enrichment claims fail as a matter of law. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5211 |
State v. Mosby
| 113545 | Cross-examination; victim; bias; manifest weight of the evidence; sexually violent predator specifications; jury waiver; consecutive sentences; cumulative-error doctrine; present ability to pay fine; R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination to comport with the evidence; prosecutor’s, State’s witnesses’, and the judge’s use of the word “victim” to refer to the complaining witness was not plain error; defendant’s convictions for rape and kidnapping were not against the manifest weight of the evidence; defendant’s waiver of a jury trial on the sexually violent predator specifications was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and defense counsel’s advice to waive a jury trial on the specifications was not ineffective assistance of counsel; trial court’s findings regarding the necessity of consecutive sentences were supported by the record; the cumulative-error doctrine did not apply because there were not numerous trial court errors; trial court erred in imposing a fine without considering the defendant’s present ability to pay the fine, as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5210 |
State v. Medlock
| 113273 | Alford plea, knowingly, voluntarily, protestations of innocence. Judgment Affirmed. Based on the totality of circumstances, we find that appellant’s comment that he was not guilty when asked whether he was satisfied with his attorney, but then immediately reversed his position and acknowledged his guilt throughout the rest of the proceedings, including the sentencing, is not sufficient to trigger a trial court’s heightened duty under Alford. Because appellant was not protesting his innocence to the level required under Alford and State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 337-338 (2d Dist. 1990), we find that his plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5208 |
State v. Walton
| 113688 | Aggravated vehicular homicide; aggravated vehicular assault; operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs; ineffective assistance of counsel; abuse of discretion. The then 20-year old defendant, while traveling at a high rate of speed, crashed his vehicle into a tree and three teenage girls died from injuries they sustained and two other people were injured. After his motion to suppress blood alcohol tests was denied, defendant pled guilty to several counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated vehicular assault as well as operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. His convictions were affirmed on appeal, and his motion to reopen appeal was denied. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea alleging ineffective assistance of counsel that was denied. When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of a plea, he must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and defendant would have insisted on going to trial. Defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a strategy to attack the procedure for blood alcohol testing and had counsel done so, he would have gone to trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw plea. Defendant did not point to anything in the record to indicate trial counsel had a basis to attack the requirements for blood testing or that such challenge would have resulted in the suppression of the blood test. As such, defendant did not show trial counsel’s decision to focus efforts on challenging the results of the blood test itself, not on the procedure, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, the record did not demonstrate that even had counsel been ineffective, defendant would have gone to trial where other evidence of impairment existed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5214 |
Horn v. DeGennaro
| 113762 | Adverse possession; magistrate’s decision; objections; Civ.R. 53; transcript of all the evidence; exhibits; independent review; ruling on objections. -Trial court’s decision rejecting the magistrate’s decision on an adverse possession claim upheld where the record demonstrates that the trial court complied with Civ.R. 53 in its obligation to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s decision and rule on the objections. Appellant failed to demonstrate error that the trial exhibits were not part of the record or that the trial court did not consider them in its Civ.R. 53 review. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5217 |
Smith v Lincoln Elec. Co.
| 113340 | Wrongful termination; summary judgment; assault and battery. Trial court properly granted summary judgment for appellee on appellant’s claims for wrongful termination against public policy where appellant failed to identify a public policy that was applicable to the facts of the case. Trial court also properly granted summary judgment for appellee on appellant’s assault and battery claim where assailant was acting outside of the scope of employment and there was no evidence that the appellee had ratified the assailant’s conduct as necessary to impute the assault and battery to the employer. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5209 |
State v. Griffon
| 113608 | Community-control violations; due process; abuse of discretion; drug test; R.C. 2929.13(E)(2). The trial court abused its discretion in finding a violation of community-control sanctions because the violation was based on the defendant’s alleged violation of protection orders that were not introduced into evidence for the purposes of determining whether his conduct constituted a violation, and a single instance of testing positive for drugs cannot form an independent basis of a violation of community-control sanctions unless the trial court makes the findings under R.C. 2929.13(E)(2) on the record. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/31/2024
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10/31/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5212 |
In re J.H.
| 113855 | Permanent custody; best interest; clear and convincing evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; continuance; case plan; reunification. Juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody of child to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where Mother made no effort to comply with the agency’s case plan for reunification. Juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s day-of-trial motion for continuance was not an abuse of discretion where Mother failed to provide a legitimate reason for the requested continuance, Mother had not engaged in agency services, and the continuance would have inconvenienced many other individuals and the court. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5102 |
State v. Hodges
| 113568 | Petition for postconviction relief; jurisdiction; timeliness; res judicata. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s postconviction-relief petition because it was untimely and did not meet the criteria in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). Furthermore, the arguments raised in the petition were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in the defendant’s direct appeal. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5097 |
State v. Johnson
| 113591 | Jury Instruction; affirmative defense; entrapment; evidence; harmless error; bribery; manifest weight. Trial court properly refused to provide a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment where the evidence did not support an entrapment defense. Trial court’s decision not to instruct a witness to stop using the words “bribe” or “bribery payment” was not improper because the words “bribe” and “bribery payment” are commonly understood and did not amount to legal conclusions. Defendant’s bribery convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where video evidence clearly showed the defendant accepting cash in exchange for fake police reports. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5098 |
State v. Taylor
| 113385, 113386, 113387 | Discretionary transfer; bindover; amenability; R.C. 2152.12; guilty plea; misdemeanor; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B). Judgment affirmed. Defendant argues that his convictions and bindover should be reversed and remanded to the juvenile court because the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion when it determined that he was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile court system and (2) committed plain error when it transferred misdemeanor offenses for adult criminal prosecution and accepted waivers premised on a misstatement of law. Because the record provides a rational and factual basis to support the juvenile court’s amenability decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by transferring the defendant’s cases to the general division. Assuming arguendo that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant’s misdemeanor charges and/or failing to distinguish them from his felony charges in its colloquy, the defendant has not demonstrated how those errors impacted his convictions. Therefore, we decline to find plain error. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5094 |
State v. Williams
| 113141 | Ineffective assistance of counsel; restitution; R.C. 2929.19(B)(5); Marsy’s Law; sufficiency. Appellant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. Sufficiency tests the adequacy of the evidence. Where the victim testified defining the items that were stolen, that testimony itself was sufficient, if believed, to establish the element of the value of the items stolen. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of evidence in violation of the best evidence rule, because the victim’s testimony was sufficient to establish the fact. The best evidence rule did not apply, and the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to object to the amount of restitution and the failure to consider his ability to pay. The amount of restitution was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, additionally, counsel’s may not have objected to avoid the imposition of a greater fine based on the testimony presented at trial. Secondly, Marsy’s Law supersedes consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay, accordingly, counsel did not err when he failed to object. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5092 |
State v. Finklea
| 113566 | Mistrial; juror misconduct; abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial. The court did not find that there had been juror misconduct when one juror allegedly overheard another juror make a comment that she had already made her mind up about appellant’s guilt or innocence but that person denied making the comment and the other jurors in her presence denied hearing the comment. Moreover, that juror was excused mid-trial for personal reasons and did not take part in deliberations. Therefore, appellant cannot show that any alleged statement materially affected his substantial rights. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5096 |
Francati v. Fuentes
| 113507 | Civ.R. 12(B)(1), subject-matter jurisdiction, probate court, definition and creation of trust within deed. Plaintiffs, members of a homeowners association, filed declaratory judgment action over dispute with actions taken by the members and of the board of directors of the homeowners association. Plaintiffs did not provide evidence the probate court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims where they claimed a trust was created by a series of deeds and other documents spanning decades or provide evidence the claims concerned the administration of an estate. As such, the probate court correctly determined it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5095 |
State v. Hamrick
| 113784 | Consecutive; sentence; clear and convincing; findings; record; criminal history; seriousness; disproportionate; course of conduct. The trial court made the necessary findings to impose consecutive sentences and the findings are supported by the record. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5101 |
In re A.L.
| 114102 | Permanent custody; best interest of the child; agency’s efforts. Our review indicates the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and, therefore, the trial court appropriately found that L.A. could not “be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.” R.C. 2151.414(E). The trial court also properly considered the statutory factors in determining that an award of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision granting permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") is affirmed. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5103 |
Olmsted Falls v. Bowman
| 113696 | Motion to compel; motion for protective order; attorney-client privilege; foreclosure; liens; summary judgment; res judicata; R.C. 2329.02; R.C. 2323.07. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted the appellee’s motion for a protective order and denied the appellant’s motion to compel. The subject information was not discoverable because it was protected under the attorney-client privilege. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee. The appellee obtained two judgments from courts of general jurisdiction against the appellant. In accordance with R.C. 2329.02, the appellee recorded the judgments as liens against appellant’s property located in appellee’s jurisdiction. The appellee initiated this foreclosure action under R.C. 2323.07. The facts surrounding the judgments appellee obtained have been extensively litigated and appellant’s attempts to contest the judgments are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. There were no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated in this foreclosure action. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5100 |
Williams v. Hung
| 113363 | Sanctions; Civ.R. 11; Civ.R. 45; attorney fees; waiver; reasonableness of fees; sworn evidence; fee bills; disqualification order; mootness; ability to pay. Judgment affirmed. The court’s award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees to the plaintiff and two nonparties is affirmed where the record demonstrates that the sanctioned party contested the reasonableness of the fees and the trial court rejected the sanctioned party’s arguments and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the sanctioned party’s arguments. Additionally, the sanctioned party’s attempt to dispute fees stemming from his disqualification as counsel are moot because no fees were awarded stemming from the disqualification and the trial court did not err in failing to consider the sanctioned party’s ability to pay where such evidence was not introduced before the trial court made its decision, despite numerous opportunities to present such evidence. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5093 |
In re D.W.
| 112655 | Probable cause; juvenile court. The juvenile court did not err in determining that probable cause did not exist to believe that the appellee committed the crimes charged. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5091 |
State v. Campbell
| 113690 | Consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14; clear and convincing. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the trial court made the requisite findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 and the findings were not clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/24/2024
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10/24/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5099 |
State v. Wilborn
| 113289 | Murder; drive-by shooting; planned; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight; involuntary manslaughter; having weapons while under disability; use of firearm by a violent career criminal; complicity; aiding; abetting; accomplice; inference stacking. - The State’s use of inference stacking to prove that the defendant possessed or used a firearm was improper. Defendant’s convictions upheld under a complicity theory because the evidence proved that the defendant aided and abetted in the murder and subsequent drive-by shooting at a residence. Defendant was not merely present but rather intended to participate in the armed robbery that pivoted to murder and a drive-by shooting once they believed they were being set up by the murder victim. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5003 |
In re R.H.
| 113939 | Permanent custody; continuance; Juv.R. 23; Juv.Loc.R. 35; reasonable efforts; R.C. 2151.419(A). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s oral motion for continuance at the permanent custody hearing, where mother requested a continuance to allow the agency to evaluate a family friend as a possible placement for the child. Mother did not comply with Juv.Loc.R. 35 and did not show that a continuance was “imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties” as required under Juv.R. 23. No one filed a motion for legal custody and no one appeared at the permanent custody hearing to testify that they were willing and able to be a caregiver or legal custodian for the child. Mother did not show that the juvenile court failed to comply with its obligations under R.C. 2151.419(A). Where the juvenile court made reasonable-efforts findings before placing child in the permanent custody of the agency, it was not required to do so again in its judgment entry granting the agency’s motion for permanent custody. Although it was not required to make such findings on the agency’s motion for permanent custody, the juvenile court’s reasonable-efforts findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record reflected that the agency developed a reasonable case plan and worked with mother for more one-and-one-half years, offering numerous referrals and services to mother, in an attempt to reunite her with her daughter. Mother, however, consistently failed to follow through with agency referrals, missing appointments, failing to comply with program requirements and ignoring recommendations for services. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5009 |
State v. Lenard
| 113878 | Motion to vacate forfeiture order; subject-matter jurisdiction; forfeiture as part of guilty plea; res judicata. In December 2005, the defendant pled guilty to various offenses and, as part of the plea, agreed to forfeit several items. The defendant did not file a direct appeal. The defendant was sentenced to a lengthy prison term in various other cases in Ohio. The defendant filed multiple appeals, writs, and motions in the trial court. Related to this appeal, in March 2024, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture order from 2005. Because the defendant agreed to forfeiture as part of his plea, the prosecutor’s failure to file a petition for forfeiture did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the defendant’s arguments challenging forfeiture are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5008 |
Wells Fargo Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Doberdruk
| 113637 | Foreclosure; supersedeas bond; motion for stay; mootness doctrine; R.C. 2329.45. The foreclosure appeal was dismissed as moot. The appellant failed to obtain a stay because she did not post the required bond set by the trial court. Therefore, the property was sold, the sale was confirmed, and the proceeds were distributed. The appellant’s argument that the appeal was not moot because R.C. 2329.45 provides a remedy when the property has been sold is without merit because R.C. 2329.45 applies only to appeals that were taken from the order confirming the sale, not from a decree of foreclosure and when an appellant successfully obtains a stay. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5007 |
State v. Malone
| 113495 | Attempted murder; felonious assault; self-defense; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; admissibility of evidence; body-camera video; App.R. 16(A)(7); jury instruction on flight; consecutive sentences for firearm specifications. Defendant’s convictions for attempted murder and felonious assault are affirmed. The relevant issue in this case, which went to a jury trial, was whether the defendant acted in self-defense when he shot the victim five times. After reviewing the record, we determine that defendant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This is not the exceptional case where the jury lost its way in convicting defendant of attempted murder and felonious assault. Defendant failed to show reversible error in the admission of evidence, jury instruction and consecutive sentences for firearm specifications. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5004 |
Schleich v. Penn Cent. Corp.
| 113632 | Toxic tort, Federal Employers’ Liability Act, necessity of expert testimony, reliability of expert testimony, summary judgment. In a Federal Employers’ Liability Act lawsuit, plaintiff alleged that while working for defendants, he was exposed to diesel exhaust fumes that was a cause of plaintiff's developing a type of leukemia. In order to support his claim, plaintiff was required to produce expert medical testimony on both general and specific causation. Plaintiff produced medical expert on the issue of causation who opined that benzene is contained in diesel exhaust and because benzene is a known cause of cancers to include leukemia, the exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of plaintiff’s condition. The trial court granted defendants’ motions to exclude plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on the grounds that it was unreliable. The trial court determined that the expert’s testimony as to general causation was unreliable because the expert’s method for finding and analyzing the scientific literature was unreliable and the expert did not support his opinion with scientific literature or explain the contradictory scientific literature that diesel exposure did not support an effect as to cancers such as leukemia. The trial court’s grant of the motion to exclude the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. After the expert testimony was excluded, plaintiff did not have evidence of general causation and summary judgment was properly granted in favor of defendants. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/17/2024
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10/17/2024
| 2024-Ohio-5005 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coil
| 113633 | Civ.R. 24 motion to intervene; foreclosure; purported contract to purchase subject property; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. For the following reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to intervene: (1) the motion, which was filed over three and one-half years after the trial court issued its foreclosure judgment and days before the foreclosure sale, was untimely; (2) the proposed intervenor did not have a recorded interest in the property; (3) the proposed intervenor’s interest in the property was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, and (4) intervention was not the only way the proposed intervenor could have protected his interest — he could have performed under his purported contract, under which the seller (the defendant homeowner) would have been deemed sufficiently aligned with the proposed intervenor so as to protect his interest. There was no requirement that the trial court automatically hold a hearing on the motion to intervene or that it issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4908 |
State v. Karr
| 113130 | Drug trafficking; drug possession; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; affidavit of indigency; fines. Defendant’s convictions for drug trafficking and drug possession are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence in the record. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an affidavit of indigency when the court imposed fines against defendant as part of his sentence for drug-related offenses. The court erred by finding defendant indigent, determining that he was unable to pay the fine and then imposing the fine. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4895 |
Cleveland Mun. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
| 113498; 113499 | Administrative appeal; board of revision; R.C. 5717.01; school board; appeal to common pleas court; R.C. 5717.05; R.C. Ch. 2506; standing. The trial court did not err in dismissing the school board’s administrative appeal. The school board did not have standing under R.C. 2506.01 to appeal a decision of a board of revision to the common pleas court. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4902 |
State v. Cottrell
| 113453 | Motion for new trial; motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; unavoidably prevented; res judicata; ineffective assistance of counsel. - Ineffective assistance of counsel — due to defense counsel’s failure to communicate a plea offer to defendant-appellant — was the basis of a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. Defendant-appellant provided only a self-serving affidavit in support of the motion, arguing that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion because he was not present when the offer was made in court and he did not learn of the alleged offer until he received a private investigator’s report almost 20 years later. A review of the record demonstrates the alleged plea offer was contained in the appellate record at the time of defendant-appellant’s direct appeal. Defendant-appellant was not unavoidably prevented from obtaining the information about the alleged plea offer that was part of the trial transcript, and res judicata precluded defendant-appellant from arguing ineffective assistance of counsel that could have been raised during the direct appeal. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-appellant’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial or opting not to conduct a hearing on the motion. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4900 |
L.W. v. A.B.
| 113397 | Motion to seal; supplemental journal entry. The trial court retained jurisdiction to vacate its original order granting the appellant’s motion to seal because it stated that a supplemental journal entry was to follow, and an appeal had not been filed. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4913 |
Orac v. Montefiore Found.
| 113514 | Summary judgment; statute of limitations; respondeat superior; agency; employee; medical claim; malpractice; negligence; expert; affidavit; report; standard of care; breach; proximate cause; wrongful death; hospital. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the nursing home defendants. The court, however, properly granted summary judgment in favor of the certified nurse practitioner based on plaintiff’s failure to submit expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of negligence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
|
10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4904 |
State v. Griffin
| 112928 | Murder; felonious assault; firearm specifications; prosecutorial misconduct; destruction of evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; self-defense; mistrial. While this court does not condone the pretrial destruction of a motor vehicle bearing bullet defects from the shooting at issue in this case, the vehicle was destroyed pursuant to departmental policy. Where the motor vehicle was potentially useful and there was no evidence of bad faith, the negligent destruction of the vehicle was not a basis to dismiss this aggravated-murder indictment. The defense was able to cross-examine detectives about the vehicle’s destruction. The defendant’s convictions for murder and felonious assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, even considering the affirmative defense of self-defense. Multiple witnesses corroborated the State’s theory of the case, which was that the defendant brought a firearm to confront a previous romantic partner’s new boyfriend and threatened him with the firearm, starting the affray that led to the shooting. The defendant’s self-defense theory largely ignored the evidence that he started the affray and his assertion that must have been fired upon first was contradicted by forensic evidence. Any error in the State’s description of the burden of proof on self-defense during closing argument was promptly corrected and the trial court gave the jury a correct instruction on the law prior to deliberations. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4894 |
Cleveland v. Greene
| 113417 | Crim.R. 11; Crim.R. 11(E); Crim.R. 11(B)(1); misdemeanor; petty offense; guilty plea; effect; complete failure; inform; dialogue; understood; presumption; refuted; remanded; vacate; restitution; R.C. 2929.28; R.C. 2929.281; moot. Reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Because the trial court completely failed to advise appellant of the effect of a guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11(E) for a misdemeanor petty offense, appellant’s plea was required to be vacated. Although the trial court engaged in a brief colloquy with appellant, confusion was expressed during the exchange, appellant initially entered a plea of no contest, there was no dialogue that would reflect appellant understood the effect of his plea, and the presumption that appellant understood his plea was a complete admission of guilt was refuted by the record. Although appellant’s restitution challenge had some merit, the restitution order was rendered moot. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4899 |
Independence v. Muscatello
| 113589 | Community-control sanctions; R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a); R.C. 2929.25(B); right to free speech; social-media restriction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the defendant’s community-control sanctions to prohibit him from posting anything about or referring to the victim on social media because the trial court had the authority to do so under R.C. 2929.25(B), the condition was rationally related to the goals of community control and not overbroad, and the condition did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to free speech. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4905 |
State v. Rafferty
| 113602 | Extradition costs; indigent defendant; conceded error; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); consecutive-sentence findings; clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record; allied offenses of similar import; R.C. 2941.25; plain error. Conceded error; trial court erred in ordering indigent defendant to pay the costs of his extradition from New Jersey. The record did not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences. Based on the limited facts in the record, defendant did not show that the burglary and attempted felonious assault offenses of which he was convicted were similar in import and significance, were committed with the same conduct and were committed with the same animus. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error in sentencing defendant on both offenses. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4906 |
State v. Armstrong
| 113717 | Grand theft; R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); vehicle; unauthorized use of a vehicle; R.C. 2913.03(A); sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed appellant’s conviction. Sufficient evidence was presented from which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes charged for grand theft and unauthorized use of a vehicle were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4912 |
McGrady v. Camara
| 113502 | Contempt; divorce decree; division of property order; reconciliation. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Husband in contempt of court for failing to assist in preparation and submission of division of property order. Parties were initially divorced in 2006 at which point the trial court gave Husband the marital home and Wife 50 percent of Husband’s pension. Husband and Wife remarried a few months after the divorce was finalized and filed for divorce again 7 years later with an agreed separation agreement. The parties’ reconciliation did not void the prior divorce decree’s property divisions. Further, the later separation agreement that included language claiming to settle all claims and release the parties of the interest in the property of the other did not change the terms of the 2006 divorce decree where the 2015 agreement did not mention the pension or expressly indicate that both parties consented or agreed to change the earlier division of property. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4903 |
State v. T.S.
| 113404 | Discretionary transfer; R.C. 2152.12(B); waiver of appealable errors by guilty plea; amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system; preponderance of the evidence; abuse of discretion; meaningful review. Juvenile court erred and abused its discretion in transferring case to the general division for criminal prosecution where it did not make the findings required R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) and the record lacked sufficient evidence to support a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that juvenile offender was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4898 |
State v. Rivera
| 113150 | Gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); hearsay; Evid.R. 803(4); medical diagnosis and treatment; sexual assault; social worker; expert; lay testimony; Evid.R. 701; Evid.R. 702; manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant’s convictions for gross sexual imposition were affirmed. Where the victim completed a forensic interview with a social worker for the purpose of developing a treatment plan, the social worker could relate what the victim said about the nature and perpetrator of the assaults without violating the hearsay rule. Moreover, any admission of hearsay would have been harmless because the case was tried to the bench and the victim herself testified at trial about the assaults. The social worker’s testimony about her experience and perceptions over years of conducting such interviews — about victims’ demeanor, normal reasons for delayed disclosure, what could be considered grooming conduct and other similar topics — was not expert testimony. There was no requirement that the victim – witness’s testimony about the assaults be corroborated with other evidence to be believed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4896 |
State v. Whatley
| 113638, 113653 | Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23; motion for leave to file motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33; Brady violation; newly discovered evidence. Affirmed. The defendant failed to proffer evidence or an argument beyond his own self-serving claims that he was unaware of information contained in the recently obtained investigative file, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying his belated petition for postconviction relief and his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4909 |
State v. Bender-Adams
| 113366 | Aggravated murder; R.C. 2903.01(A); self-representation; standby counsel; plain error; other-acts evidence; Evid.R. 404(B); harmless error; scope of cross-examination; abuse of discretion; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court did not violate defendant’s right to self-representation when it limited the role of standby counsel. Even if trial court had unduly limited the role of standby counsel during suppression hearing, defendant made no showing that he was prejudiced as a result where he did not challenge the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress on appeal. Trial court improperly admitted other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) where the evidence was not shown to be relevant to a legitimate nonpropensity purpose, going to a material issue that was actually in dispute between the parties; however, the error was harmless where the evidence had no impact on the verdict, there was no reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the defendant’s convictions and excising the improperly admitted evidence, the remaining evidence admitted at trial established defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination of codefendant, prohibiting defense counsel from questioning codefendant about the specific sentence he had faced prior to plea deal where to inform the jury of the specific penalties the witness faced before his guilty pleas would also inform the jury of the penalties the defendant faced. Defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder and related offenses were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to conduct a thorough investigation or obtain expert services. Defendant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged errors on the part of trial counsel. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4897 |
State v. Nettles
| 113683 | Right to confrontation; motion to withdraw as counsel; motion to proceed pro se; abuse of discretion; delay tactics; self-representation; right to counsel of choice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and denying appellant’s request to proceed pro se. The motions were made just a few days prior to trial, and the request to proceed pro se was made as a delay tactic. The case had already been pending for close to 500 days, trial had been continued three times at the appellant’s request, and the appellant did not show that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The trial court erred in allowing a vacationing witness to testify via remote video feed, but the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4910 |
State v. Mobley
| 113471 | Disproportionate sentences; waiver; failure to object; proportionality; consecutive sentences; moot; error of law; contrary to law. Defendant failed to object to any proportionality issues and thereby waived the issue on appeal. Even assuming he did not waive the issue, the defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to his codefendant’s sentence and was not outside the mainstream of local judicial practice and was therefore not contrary to law. Further, the court made no findings or orders in its journal entry in the case at issue for the counts in this case to run consecutively. The journal entry at issue explicitly runs all the counts concurrently. No error of law occurred in this case regarding sentencing. | Klatt | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4901 |
SPCG Properties, Ltd. v. Moore
| 113609 | Summary judgment; final order; appeal; motion to vacate judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); substitute; timely appeal. Judgment affirmed. By appealing the January 5, 2024 journal entry denying appellant’s motion to vacate judgment, appellant is attempting to use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment as a substitute for a timely appeal. The utilization of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in this instance is improper. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4907 |
Ross v. Car Parts Warehouse, Inc.
| 113691 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); open and obvious; invitees; duty of care; negligence. Plaintiff-appellant appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee finding that the puddle of oil in the parking lot was an open-and-obvious danger. We find that no genuine issue of material fact exists because the large green or rainbow-colored oily puddle in the parking lot was an open-and-obvious condition, which eliminated defendant-appellee’s duty to warn a business invitee, such as plaintiff-appellant. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
10/10/2024
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10/10/2024
| 2024-Ohio-4911 |
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